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Benumbed 
by Carl E. Schneider 
!originally intended to write a col-umn on tort liability and research 
ethics, and I still' plan to do so. But 
this column is a cri de coeur as I finish 
another semester teaching law and 
bioethics. This year, I asked with grow-
ing frequency, urgency, and exaspera-
tion, "Must law's reverence for autono-
my squeeze out the impulse to kindness? 
Where is the beneficence in bioethics?" 
These questions assail me every term. 
Why? 
Consider Steele v. Hamilton County 
Community Mental Health Board. 1 Mr. 
Steele was involuntarily "hospitalized 
after his family reported that he was 'see-
ing things and trying to fight imaginary 
foes."' Concluding that Mr. Steele was 
paranoid schizophrenic, the hospital 
sought judicial permission to give Mr. 
Steele antipsychotic drugs without his 
"informed consent." Eventually the case 
reached the Ohio Supreme Court. It 
began its analysis by intoning a hymn to 
"the right to refuse medical treatment," 
which it called "a fundamental right in 
our country, where personal security, 
bodily integrity, and autonomy are cher-
ished liberties." The court concluded 
that the state could not administer the 
drugs unless it showed by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that (1) a patient 
"lacks the capacity to give or withhold 
informed consent," (2) "the benefits of 
the antipsychotic medication outweigh 
the side effects," and (3) "there is no less 
intrusive treatment . . . as effective in 
treating the illness." Piling Ossa on Pe-
lion, the court imposed elaborate proce-
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dural requirements for issuing and 
maintaining such a judicial order. 
Perhaps this is the right result. It is 
not, as opinions in this area go, extreme, 
which is one reason I've selected it to 
discuss. Certainly the history of civil 
commitment and hospitalization of the 
mentally ill has sometimes been ugly. 
Surely infringing autonomy can be cruel 
in its own ways, as Jay Katz's famous 
story of Iphigenia reminds us. 2 But the 
court's opinion in Steele does not justifY 
its holding, and the omissions in it make 
it heartless. Painfully absent is any sense 
that poor Mr. Steele lay bound on the 
rack of a disease that was destroying his 
life and devastating his family and that 
ameliorating this wretchedness was even 
desirable. The court nodded briefly to 
"the state's parens patriae power," but its 
attention and concern went not to the 
savagery of the disease, but to the men-
ace of the state. The court's anxiety was 
overwhelmingly that "[t]his type of in-
trusion clearly compromises one's liberty 
interests in personal security, bodily in-
tegrity, and autonomy." When the court 
mentioned treatment, it lingered loving-
ly on the side effects of antipsychotic 
drugs, since " [ t] he seriousness of the 
possible side effects of these types of 
drugs cannot be overstated." The court 
went on to overstate that seriousness, 
not least because its information was in-
dolently drawn from legal, not medical, 
sources and out of date. 
Hence the court strewed barriers be-
tween Mr. Steele and treatment. It re-
peatedly imposed the highest civil stan-
dard of proof-"clear and convincing 
evidence" rather than "a preponderance 
of the evidence" -and it devised proce-
dures that were forbiddingly burden-
some. If all this inspired better decisions 
about treatment, it might be justifiable. 
But the court never bothered to assess 
the effects of its requirements, and in 
other contexts we would call them "bu-
reaucratic red tape." The court seemed 
more influenced by One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo's Nest than evidence about para-
noid schizophrenia, commitment pro-
ceedings, or due process. 
Yet the court's apparent indifference 
to Mr. Steele's illness was not forced 
upon it. The law of procedural due 
process, while it interprets an express 
constitutional text, is in all else a judicial 
creation. And the law of substantive due 
process (the wellspring of "the right to 
refuse medical treatment") is fons et origo 
judicially created. What is more, why 
was the right attributed to Mr. Steele the 
right to refuse treatment (and not, say, a 
right to have treatment)? Did he choose 
this argument? If he was seeing things 
and fighting imaginary foes, how lucid-
ly, how autonomously, was he thinking? 
If he did not assert the right to refuse 
treatment, who chose for him, and why 
did the court accept the choice so un-
critically? More broadly, what can be 
said of a legal system that develops so 
zealously, so sanctimoniously, the right 
to refuse medical treatment while ignor-
ing the tens of millions who cannot get 
it? 
I was not heartened when I turned 
from the court's opinion to my class's re-
action. Law is taught through "case-
books" that comprise cases, statutes, ad-
ministrative regulations, commentary, 
text, and questions. My co-author wrote 
the section of our casebook that consid-
ers decisions for incompetent patients 
and thus Steele. She realized that many 
students would know little about mental 
illness and wanted to give them some 
sense of what a paranoid schizophrenic 
must endure. She did a masterly job, not 
just through medical and social data, 
but also through excerpts from a para-
noid schizophrenic's moving account of 
his torment in the throes of the disease 
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and his partial but blessed release when 
he was finally treated. 
Nevertheless, the class's first and vir-
tually only reaction to Steele was that the 
opinion was dangerously tolerant of the 
state's invasion of Mr. Steele's rights: 
Everyone has a right to autonomy and 
therefore to refuse medical treatment, 
and schizophrenics do not lose their 
rights just because they are ill. Mr. Steele 
and his family might be suffering, but 
forced medication would be an intolera-
ble step down the slippery slope toward 
the end of personal autonomy. End of 
Story. 
If I thought my students were partic-
ularly callous, I would not be disturbed 
by their reaction to Steele. But they are, if 
anything, exceptionally decent. I know 
quite a lot about law students: I was one, 
I teach them, and I am writing a book 
about how our graduates have made de-
cisions about their careers. I always 
emerge from my interviews with an en-
livened respect for our students and for 
their seriousness and goodness. The in-
terviews make me glad to be their 
teacher. 
So what leads good people like my 
students (and, presumably, the judges in 
Steele) to respond so indifferently to the 
misery of Mr. Steele and his family? 
That is too big a question for so small a 
space. But law has its own imperatives. 
Law's "idioms rule us in ways we do not 
always grasp or desire, and they have 
limits growing out of the ends for which 
they were created."3 Law is about mini-
mums, not maximums; rules, not com-
passion; deterring wrong, not inspiring 
right. It is driven by distrust. It can be 
satisfied by forms, by outward signs 
without inward grace. All this is often 
unavoidable. But then law should pro-
ceed-as it did not in Steele-with deli-
cacy, discretion, prudence, modesty, and 
insight into and sympathy for the lives 
of those it traps. 
In particular, the law's moral clumsi-
ness should make us cautious when legal 
reasoning colonizes other institutions 
and should make us zealous to preserve 
the extra-legal virtues that those institu-
tions should nurture. It is easy to under-
stand the resort to law: It always looks 
like the cheapest way to change behav-
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ior. And the grand principles that we 
hope animate law are so near to our 
hearts and so embedded in our culture 
that we carelessly embrace the legal rules, 
forms, and procedures that attend them. 
But when legal thinking infiltrates social 
behavior, the bad in legal reasoning dri-
ves out the good in social life. The legal 
principle of autonomy is so "greedy" a 
principle, a principle so determined to 
extend itself to its limits, that it crowds 
out what patients themselves may think 
are more important matters, matters of 
decency and compassion unmoored to 
ideas about autonomy. And so homely 
virtues like solicitude and kindness get 
lost in the struggle. 
But law should not shoulder all the 
blame; "bioethics" shares these faults 
without the law's excuse of special im-
peratives. As Renee Fox gently puts it, 
even the "benefiting of others advocated 
in bioethical thought is circumscribed 
by respectful deference to individual 
rights, interests, and autonomy; and 
minimizing the harm done to individu-
als is more greatly accentuated than the 
maximization of either personal or col-
lective good."4 
Consider an example at the intersec-
tion of law and bioethics. I have been 
reading articles on "advance care plan-
ning" by eminent bioethicists and doc-
tors. Often I can barely tell that they are 
instructing physicians on how to help 
human beings face decay and death. The 
articles march straight to the point-pa-
tients have a right to make medical deci-
sions, doctors should transcribe their 
wishes in legally binding form. Hardly a 
word about the sustenance and com-
fort-physical, moral, emotional-that 
dying people might crave. Hardly a hint 
that sympathy, understanding, reassur-
ance, and support might be as dear to 
patients as legal rights. No sense that pa-
tients' troubles can be eased by costless 
kindness, by the simple empathy-or 
even good manners-that would make 
stories like Reynolds Price's inconceiv-
able: "The presiding radiation oncolo-
gist had begun our first meeting by 
telling me, with all the visible concern of 
a steel cheese-grater, that my tumor was 
of a size that was likely unprecedented in 
the annals of Duke Hospital."5 And 
what is gained when the law's forms so 
overwhelm the doctor's thoughts? Too 
often, too little. For example, evidence 
now proliferates that the law's gift to the 
dying-the living will-rarely serves its 
intended purpose.6 
Law speaks of "balancing" individual 
rights and state interests. Bioethics 
speaks of serving both autonomy and 
beneficence. These are impoverished en-
deavors at best. But if law and bioethics 
could at least treat these pairs of con-
cerns with the even-handedness their 
formulas seem to imply, they might 
achieve a richer morality and a wiser pol-
icy. From the start, however, "individual 
rights" and "autonomy" exude the odor 
of sanctity, while "state interests" and 
"beneficence" trail the stench of pater-
nalism, even tyranny. 
So as I prepared for class by reviewing 
the cases and statutes on law at the end 
of life and reading articles on planning 
for death, I could not repress the memo-
ry of one visit to a hospital palliative care 
unit. A patient had arrived from another 
hospital. He had only hours to live, and 
he was in apparently untreated pain. He 
had tried to tear out his IV, and blood 
smeared his sheets. He had writhed to 
find a painless position, and his gown 
hardly covered his nakedness. As he lay 
dying he cried out, "Don't let your chil-
dren die like this in pain. Don't let your 
children die like this in pain." 
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